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The Impact of the Public Sector Pay Review Bodies in the UK
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This paper examines the impact of the Pay Review Bodies (PRBs) on the public sector pay of 
their remit groups. We compare the real weekly earnings of groups of workers in occupations 
covered by PRBs, in the remainder of the public sector and in the private sector using LFS 
data from 1993 to 2006 for 10 occupational sub-groups. We describe how the pattern of 
relative occupational pay varies over time and by gender and can be interpreted as 
compensating pay differentials. In several public sector occupations, men incur a much larger 
earnings penalty than women. Our difference- in-difference impact estimation method relies 
on comparison of the difference between any specific PRB group and other (non-PRB) public 
sector workers over time. For the most part we find that the PRBs have had little or no 
practical impact on earnings over and above that of comparable public sector workers not 
covered by the PRBs. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the earnings received by different types of public sector worker in 
Britain in the last 14 years.  In particular, we distinguish between workers who have their 
earnings determined by review bodies and workers in the remainder of the public sector.  
Using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS)  we compare  the earnings of  these 
workers in order to assess the impact of the Pay Review Bodies (PRBs) on  the relative 
earnings of their remit groups. We consider how real weekly earnings evolved over time 
within specific occupations of interest and examine how  the  differences between 
comparable workers in PRB occupations, in the remainder of the public sector and in the 
private sector changed in each year from 1993 to 2006.  We investigate whether any gains 
in real earnings for the  PRB occupations  have been translated into improvements in 
relative pay.   
There are 6  Pay Review Bodies (for School Teachers, Nurses and other Health 
professions,
1 D octors and Dentists, the Prison Service, the Armed Forces, and Senior 
Salaries).  The Police Negotiating Board is supported by the same secretariat.  The Boards 
cover 1.8 million workers.  One of the main functions of these independent Review Bodies 
is to advise the government about appropriate pay awards.  A broad question, and the 
motivation for this paper, is how should public sector pay be determined?  Prior to 1971 
there were a variety of mechanisms in place for different occupations.  In recent years (and 
recurrently through time) a major constraint in public sector pay determination has been 
government expenditure allocated to separate government departments.  This has variously 
been modelled by Zabalza (1979) as an 'expenditure constraint', Leslie (1985) as 'cash 
limits' and by Borjas (1980) as 'Federal budget limits'.  These limits may at least partially 
constrain the decisions of the PRBs.  We examine whether there is any difference between 
the earnings outcomes determined via the PRBs rather than other arrangements within the 
public sector. Our results suggest that there is no basic difference between p ay 
determination via the PRBs and other public sector occupational arrangements.  This 
finding casts doubt on whether the PRBs still have an effective role to play since their 
awards reflect what is happening elsewhere in the public sector.   
                                                 
1  This became the NHS Pay Review Body in July 2007.   2 
Figure 1  presents an  historical perspective on the role of PRBs in public sector pay 
settlements.  It shows the trends in recommended pay awards by the different PRBs over 
the period 1971 to 2006.  We can see from this that, in the first 22 years until 1993, public 
sector pay awards were rather large and sometimes apparently erratic due to changing 
inflationary pressures.  Looking at Figure 1, we see that data period for our analysis - 
1993-2006 - was one of unprecedented stability in terms of wage settlements.  In each year 
over this period all the recommended pay awards (and all the settlements) were broadly in 
line with inflation and very stable. This means we could continue to argue that the PRBs 
have actually done their job and brought most pay settlements into line with government 
expenditure targets.  The corollary of this argument is that they are no longer necessary.  
However, a converse argument is that our analysis does not allow us to observe the 
counterfactual - i.e. a world where PRBs do not exist. It could be argued that in such a 
world we may well return to erratic inflationary or unfairly low pay settlements.  This 
paper is not able to judge this - we are merely able to quantify the impact of the PRBs 
relative to the pay awards in the non-PRB public sector. 
Insert Figure 1 
The evidence we present suggests that the pattern of relative pay varied with some PRB 
occupations doing substantially better than comparable workers in the private sector and 
some worse.  In several public sector occupations, men incur a much larger earnings 
penalty than women.  Real earnings are often significantly different in occupations 
covered by PRBs compared with the remainder of the public sector although this depends 
on year and occupation.  We interpret these findings on the pattern of relative occupational 
pay across time as evidence of the time path of compensating occupational wage 
differences. 
Many papers have studied either specific occupations such as nurses or teachers
2 in 
isolation  or  the broad aggregate such as the public sector as a whole.
3  This paper 
examines a range of public sector occupations associated with the PRBs providing some 
insight into the effects of the PRBs.  It deals with more occupations than most previous 
work although it does report results for more broad aggregates.  It also provides an update 
of some previous analysis. 
                                                 
2  See, for example, Pudney and Shields (2000) and Dolton (1990). 
3  See, for example, Blackaby, Murphy and O’Leary (1999) and Disney and Gosling (1998)   3 
The approach we adopt to identify the impact of the PRBs is to use a difference-in-
difference estimation method.  This method relies on comparison of the difference 
between any specific PRB group and other (non-PRB) public sector workers over time. 
Specifically we compare the change in the estimates for different occupational groups in 
two consecutive years using the non-PRB public sector as the control group.  We then do 
this for every pair of years for each occupational group. We also suggest an estimation 
method which allows inference for each diff-in-diff point estimate.  This means we can 
then examine the complete trend in occupational impacts of the PRBs over the whole 
period from  1993-2006.  The crucial identification assumption here is that the 
unobservable factors in occupational choices will remain largely the same in two 
consecutive years.  In large samples this is not an unreasonable assumption.  Using this 
identification strategy we find (for the most part) that the PRBs have little or no impact 
over and above comparable public sector pay not covered by the PRBs. 
The process of pay determination in the public sector varies in different occupations.  In 
total around 1.8 million public sector employees (about 40% of the whole public sector
4) 
have their pay set directly by government based on the recommendations of Pay Review 
Boards (see for example the School Teachers Pay Review Body (2002)) which receive 
evidence from different parties but do not engage in pay negotiations between them.  Most 
commonly public sector employees in the UK are represented by national unions. In the 
non-PRB public sector in recent years there has been a tendency to move away from 
centralized wage setting towards individual government departments being responsible for 
wage setting.  There have also been attempts to introduce individualised pay settlements 
based on  changing contracts,  performance-related elements or the movement towards 
more flexible working arrangements.  For example, hospital consultants and GPs have 
both had new contracts in the last 5 years. Also a form of performance related pay was 
introduced for teachers in 2000 and there are now negotiations taking place about the use 
of more classroom assistants to cover elements of work done by teachers. (see Dolton et al 
2003) 
Much of the literature on public/private sectors differences has focussed on the difference 
in pay in the two sectors.
5  A good proportion of this literature has been devoted to trying 
                                                 
4 In our sample 47% of male and 44% of female public sector employees come under the remit of the PRBs. 
5  See Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986), Gregory and Borland (1999) for summaries.   4 
to account for the different composition of public and private sectors.  This involves the 
use of various decomposition techniques to attempt to account for the difference in the 
mix of occupations, observable characteristics and other sources of differences in the two 
sectors.  More recent papers have attempted to model the choice of entering one of these 
two sectors at the same time as modelling the determination of earnings in these two 
sectors (see Bargain 2007).  It is suggested that there is some form of self selection in 
terms of the kind of person who chooses to enter one sector rather than another.  Even 
after using these techniques there is a wide range on the public/private wage differential 
after conditioning for all the differences in the two sectors.  Gregory and Borland (1999) 
present a summary of the estimates for the UK which vary from .09 to .38 for women and 
.05 to -.33 for men depending the year of the data and on whether we consider manual or 
non-manual workers. 
In the UK over the last 30 years, there has been a slow decline in the earnings of 
individuals working in the public sector relative to private sector earnings. Correcting for 
basic characteristics like age, education region etc, in 1976 female earnings in the public 
sector were 42% higher than those in the private sector.  In the same year male earnings 
were 13% higher in the public sector on average than in the private sector. (see Dolton and 
McIntosh 2003). By 2006 we find that female public sector earnings are only 6% higher 
than those in the private sector.  In the same year male public sector earnings were lower 
than their private sector counterparts.  
What explains these basic trends in public and private sector labour markets?  The decline 
in relative public sector pay is partly due to the public expenditure constraints of 
successive governments over the 1979-2006 period and partly the increasing private 
demand for professional, technological and highly skilled labour which has forced up 
relative wages in that sector.  This declining relative wage has caused real recruitment 
problems for occupations like teachers and nurses. 
Recruitment has become increasingly difficult in public sector jobs in the South-East, and 
in London in particular.  Real wages rose in the public sector by roughly the same amount 
in the South-East of England as they are in other regions over the period 1994-2001, while 
private sector wages were increasing at a much faster rate in this region compared to the 
rest of the country.  The demand for professional private sector workers is strongest in 
these locations.  If private sector wages are higher this also impacts directly on the local 
cost of living and hence the difficulty of recruiting and retaining public sector workers in   5 
London and the South-East.  This puts pressure on the public sector to improve career 
prospects and pay London allowances and other additional payments like housing 
subsidies. 
 
2. Data: Sources and Preparation 
This paper summarises data on large samples of individuals extracted from the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS).  The LFS gives us information on large numbers of individuals in 
each year from 1993-2006 inclusive.  LFS currently collects information in each quarter 
from a random sample of 60,000 households.  It collects information on individuals using 
as its sampling frame  households living at private addresses in Great Britain.  Each 
individual remains in the sample for 5 quarters so each quarter’s sample is made up of five 
waves of individuals, and each wave is interviewed in five consecutive quarters.  Since 
1997, individual's earnings are potentially recorded in only 2 of 5 quarters, the first and the 
last
6.  In all years, we obtain our annual data by aggregating the data for each quarter.  
Definition of variables 
Occupation 
The public sector is broadly defined as all individuals working for central and local 
government and related institutions.  It includes civil servants, local government officers, 
teachers, doctors, nurses, university staff and police.  We define membership of the public 
sector in terms of occupational groups.  Certain occupations are defined as within the 
public sector and the remainder as not.  The precision of the definition depends on the 
occupation.  Local government officers and nurses, for example, are allocated to the public 
sector.  All local government officers will be working in the public sector but some nurses 
will be working in the private sector.  This occupational definition focuses on the earnings 
differences between occupations rather than between individuals potentially covered by 
the PRBs.  This may not present a problem in the current context since the public sector 
                                                 
6 This data also facilitates a panel analysis of the effect of being in an occupation covered by a PRB.  We use 
this panel data on the repeat wage data for each individual to examine the effect of changing between 
sectors: public sector Non-PRB, public sector PRB and the private sector.  Identification in this model comes 
from those who change sector but our estimation of this model showed no significant effects of such 
changes.  But in this case the fixed effects identification relied on too few observations.  The identification 
using diff-in-diff which we focus on in this paper provides clearer conclusions based on the whole sample.   6 
dominates these markets and effectively acts as a price setter for those markets.  If this is 
the case, the PRB will be the main actor determining earnings in a particular occupation.   
Our definition is related to those used by others such as Nickell and Quintini (2002). 
We identify the following occupational groups (1) Primary School Teachers (2) Secondary 
School Teachers ( 3) Nurses and Midwives (4) Practices Allied to Medicine 
(Radiographers, therapists etc) (5) Medical practitioners and Dentists (6) Prison Officers 
(7) Armed Forces and (8) Police covered by the Review B oards and the related Police 
Negotiating Board.  We refer to these as the PRB groups.  We cannot separately identify 
the occupations relevant for the Senior Salaries Review Body.  Where a PRB contains 
relatively large and distinct groups, we have considered subsets of the workers covered by 
a PRB in order to investigate the potentially different impact of the pay awards on those 
groups.  The Prison Service Review Board made its first recommendations in 2002.  We 
have treated it as a distinct group in all our work although clearly its PRB would only play 
a role after 2001.  All remaining Boards were established before the period covered by our 
data.
7  The remaining public sector workers comprise a group called non-PRB public 
sector.   
The occupational classification changed in 2000 so we were forced to use SOC90 codes 
from 1993 to 2000 and SOC 2000 codes from 2001 to 2006 producing a discontinuity in 
2000/2001.  The main implications for our analysis are that Paramedics are PAMs after 
2000 but non-PRB before and that  Prison Officers (principal officers and above) are 
‘Prison Officers’ before 2001 and non-PRB thereafter.  Appendix A gives the list of 
occupations that comprise those two groups in the public sector using this typology. 
Earnings and Other variables 
The dependent variable  in our regressions is the log  of the  gross weekly pay in the 
individual’s main job including any overtime pay.
8  All earnings variables have been 
adjusted using the Retail Price Index and are expressed in 2003 constant prices.   
Our  analysis  includes controls  for the separate effects o n earnings of gender, 
qualifications, age, and region and working in a manual occupation.    Since there is 
                                                 
7  The first recommendations of the School Teachers and Nurses and Other Health Professions Boards were 
made respectively in 1992 and 1984. 
8  Pay determination is mainly driven by for full time employees working ‘standard’ hours in PRB 
occupations so weekly earnings are a natural variable of interest.   7 
considerable variability in the number of hours worked even amongst full time workers, 
we control for the number of working hours.  The full regression results are available from 
the authors on request. 
Our qualification dummies  measure the highest  academic  or vocational  qualification 
obtained.  They identify the groups: “Degree or equivalent”, “Higher Education, “GCE A 
Level or equivalent", “GCSE A*-C or equiv", “Other quals" with the control group “No 
quals”..  Hours of work is defined as the total usual hours worked each week in the 
individual’s main job (including basic hours and unpaid and paid overtime).    Age is 
represented by the age groups 20-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54 and 55-60.  This 
set of groups is fine enough to allow age to have a non-linear effect on earnings but broad 
enough to have a large number of observations in each group.  The analysis uses the 
standard regions.  The data for 1997-2006 uses place of work to define region and 1993-
1996 place of residence producing a potential small discontinuity in 1996-97.
9   
Sample definition   
We include only full-time employees working in Great Britain because the individuals 
covered by the Pay Review Bodies are full time workers or on scales related to the pay of 
full time workers.  Our analysis excludes self employed persons because the main groups 
we are interested are employees within the public sector and because the reported income 
is often not as reliable for self employed individuals as it is for employed.  We restricted 
the sample to individuals working between 30 and 70 hours
10.  We also removed 
individuals in the bottom and top 1% of the distributions of real weekly earnings for the 
sub-periods 1993-1996, 1997-2000 and 2001-2006.   
The size of the sample has varied over time and we only retain respondents satisfying the 
criteria above and with all the information needed for our analysis.  Nonetheless, our 
estimating samples contain over 11,000 individuals in 1993, over 23,000 for 1994-96, over 
46,000 for 1997-98, over 44,000 for 1999, over 41,000 for 2000-02 and nearly 39,000 in 
2003 falling to over 34,000 in 2006. 
                                                 
9  We chose this date rather than 1995 because of the fundamental change in the collection of earnings data 
that took place in 1997. 
10  These were approximately the 1
st and 99
th percentiles for reported hours for public sector workers in 
2001-2006.   8 
Overview of the data 
Public sector and private sector earnings differences (Unadjusted) 
Panels a and b of Figure 2 display the observed mean values for real weekly earnings by 
gender for individuals working in the private and public sectors by gender in each year 
from 1993 to 2006 (in 2003 prices).
11  The growth in nominal earnings outpaced that of 
prices in both sectors so real earnings grew for both men and women over the period.  
Private sector earnings for men grew continuously after 1994 until 2005 moving from 
about £368 (2003 prices) in 1993-94 to about £422 in 2005-06, an increase of 15%.  There 
was no sustained growth in public sector pay until after 1998 when it grew continuously 
until 2005 before falling back in 2006.  Overall public sector earnings for men changed 
from £478 in 1993-94 and again in 1998 to about £524 in 2005-06, a growth of 10%.  The 
pattern of pay for women was similar in both sectors.  There was continuous growth after 
1995 (although there were declines in the public sector in 1995 and 2005).  Overall private 
sector pay for women grew by 23% from £260 in 1993 to £321 in 2006 while public 
sector pay for women grew by 20% from £370 in 1993 to £443 in 2006.  
See Figure 2. 
Public sector workers enjoyed a substantial earnings advantage over private sector workers 
for the whole of the period.  The smallest premiums over the period were 23% for men in 
2003 and 37% for women in 2001.  Such broad comparisons do not necessarily compare 
like with like because the composition of the workforce may differ between sectors and 
over time.  We therefore adjust the mean earnings using regression functions to control for 
the separate effects on earnings of different characteristics such as qualifications, age, and 
region.  Panel c of Figure 2 presents estimates of the earnings differentials by gender 
corrected for different attributes.
12  The estimates predict the percentage increase in 
earnings if an individual moves from the private to the public sector.
13   
The pay of women remains higher in the public sector although the corrected differentials 
are much smaller than  the raw ones, ranging from 3% in 2002 to 9% in 1994.  The 
                                                 
11  The geometric means are used for consistency with the later analysis of the log of earnings. 
12  The estimates are obtained from a regression by gender of log weekly earnings on a dummy for ‘working 
in the public sector’ (in either a PRB or a non PRB occupation) and the controls described earlier.  Let d be 
the estimated coefficient of the public sector dummy.  The figure displays f=100(exp(d)-1). 
13  The largest p-value for the estimates for women is 0.003.  The p-values for men are greater than 0.234 for 
1997, 1999 and 2006.   9 
corrected differential is higher for women than for men; the difference was, for example, 
about 7-8 percentage points during 2001-2006.  The change in the differential over time is 
quite striking for men.  It declined from 5% in 1993 to -4% in 2002 (albeit with a small 
rise from 1998 to 1999) before growing to -1% in 2006.  Men working in the public sector 
enjoyed a noticeable pay advantage over comparable men in the private sector at the start 
of period but this had vanished by 1997-98 and thereafter there has been a pay penalty for 
working in the public sector.  
 
3. The Econometric Model 
The data are a sequence of 14 cross-sections, one for each year from 1993 to 2006.  We 
index individuals by i and time by t (t=0, 1,.., 13).  There are thousands of individuals 
(i=1,.., Nt) for each value of t but only one value of t for each individual.  Let PRIV, NON, 
and  PRBo ( o=1,.,O) be, respectively, mutually exclusive dummies for working in the 
private sector, the non-PRB public sector and the ‘o
th’ PRB occupation,  The regression 
model for year t is: 
Yit=at+btPRIVit+SodotPRBoit+SkgktXkit+eit    i=1,.., Nt    1. 
where Xkit (k=1,.,K) are the control variables (such as age, qualification, location).   
dot shows the differences in pay between the o’th PRB occupation and the non-PRB public 
sector.  If X were omitted and the error terms satisfied the standard OLS assumptions, then 
the OLS estimators of dot would be the differences estimator used in experimental and 
quasi-experimental analyses.  If conditional independence assumption holds for X, then the 
estimators would be differences estimators with additional regressors similar to matching 
estimators.   
Conditional mean independence is debatable.  It is known that educational standards are 
much higher in the public sector and that there are regional variations in earnings 
differentials between private and public sector workers.  Regressors such as qualifications 
or location may be the outcome of sector choice.  On the other hand, some of these choices 
at least are typically made early in one’s career and are effectively predetermined for the 
people in our sample.  It is also widely recognised that public sector workers enjoy various 
non-pecuniary benefits such as greater job security and more generous pension provision.  
The effects of these unobservables are unlikely to be conditioned away by our independent   10 
variables.  The regressors therefore have their standard interpretation as controls for the 
potentially diverse nature of individuals in each occupation and we explore  ways of 
modelling the error terms.   
If the underlying data generation mechanism for the error terms is stable over time, OLS 
estimation may yield information about the changes in differentials even when the errors 
are correlated with the key variables.  Essentially we argue that the OLS estimates are 
inconsistent estimators of the parameters but that the asymptotic bias is constant from year 
to year.  If we include fixed effects, our previous model becomes: 
Yit=at+btPUBit +SodotPRBoit+SkgktXkit+Ai+eit   i=1,.., Nt    2. 
Ai is an unobserved, individual fixed effect (such as unobserved ability and attitudes to job 
attributes) that may have different relevance for different occupations. 
Define the linear projections of Ai as: 
  Ai=lNON+lPRIVPRIVit+SoloPRBoi+SkmkXkit+hit    i=1,.., Nt 
Then the de facto estimating equation for each year is found by substitution. 
Yit=(at+lNON)+(bt+lPRIV)PRIVit +So(dot+lo)PRBoit+Sk(gkt+mk)Xkit +uit     i=1,.., Nt  3. 
The OLS estimates of the PRB dummies ( dot) are consistent estimates of ( dot+lo).  
However we can retrieve consistent estimates of the impact of public sector pay 
bargaining by differencing.  Consider the probability limit of the estimates for two time 
periods p and q as the sample size becomes arbitrarily large:  
Plim(doq-dop)=(doq-dop)              4. 
The changes in the estimators from period  p to period  q consistently estimate the 
underlying changes in the impacts of occupations on earnings.  If (dop-doq)=0, we would 
conclude that pay in the PRB occupation has not changed relative to nonPRB public sector 
pay.  Since dop measures PRB pay relative to non-PRB pay at time p and doq measures 
PRB pay relative to non-PRB pay at time q, we will interpret (doq-dop) as a difference-in-
difference estimator.  The success of this identification strategy depends on stability in the 
error structure.  Although many panel studies assume stability over long periods of time, 
we examine only consecutive years (i.e. t and t+1) and argue that the nature of public 
sector occupations means that it takes time for the stock of workers to change their 
characteristics.  More specifically we assume that the occupational choices (or the non-  11 
random selection device conditioning occupational entry), in large samples, for any given 
occupation remain the same in consecutive years. Hence, where our identification strategy 
is potentially limited is if we wished to make inferences about the relative position several 
years apart. 
A similar argument could be made in the context of a treatment model.  Assuming an 
unobservable,  Uit, that is potentially correlated with the regressors of interest.  The 
treatment model resolves the inconsistency of the OLS estimates by including a selection 
term representing the implied omitted variables.  The treatment model is: 
Yit=at+btPRIVit +SodotPRBoit+SkgktXkit+lit+eit   i=1,.., Nt    5. 
where lit=E(Uit|NONit=1)NONit +E(Uit|PRIVit=1)PRIVit+SoE(Uit|PRBoit=1)PRBoit. 
Define the linear projection of lit as: 
  lit= lNON+lPRIVPRIVit+SoloPRBoit+SkmkXkit+hit 
The previous argument then follows. 
In order to test our difference-in-difference impact estimates we seek a way of making 
direct inferences on the significance of the impact parameters.  We now outline a simple 
way of getting standard errors for these estimates.  First, pool the data for two consecutive 
years, p and p+1, and create a time dummy for the second year: t=1 if t=p+1 and t=0 if 
t=p.  Then estimate:  
Yit=a+t+bPRIVit+SodoPRBoit+SkgkXkit+b*(t·PRIVit)+Sodo*(t·PRBoit)+Skgk*(t·Xkit)+eit 
  t= p, p+1; p=1993-1995, 1997-1999, 2001-2005         6. 
The differences in predicted log earnings for someone in the o’th PRB occupation and the 
non-PRB public sector are do for period p and do+do* for period p+1.  Hence do* measures 
the change in the pay of the PRB occupation relative to the non-PRB public sector 
[(doq-dop) above] and its standard error can be used to test whether this change is zero.   12 
 
4.  Results 
Tables 1 a and 2a  show the estimated effects of working in different public sector 
occupations when the sample is split by gender.
14  The Tables report  the estimated 
coefficients for the corresponding occupational dummy.  The asterisks show the statistical 
significance of the estimates.
15  One asterisk  means that the corresponding estimate is 
significant at the 10% level; two significant at 5%; and three significant at 1% on a 2-
tailed test.
16  The null hypothesis is that working in the relevant occupation has the same 
effect on earnings as working in the non-PRB public sector.  The final number shows the 
number of observations in that occupational group.  There are discontinuities in the data in 
1996-97 and, particularly, in 2000-01 when SOC 2000 was introduced.  The Prison 
Service Review Board only began in 2001 although we have treated them as a separate 
group throughout to avoid another discontinuity.  Tables 1b and 2b show the estimates of 
the changes in the coefficients (b* and do* above).  The asterisks on the rows labelled non-
PRB public sector show the statistical significance of the estimates.  The null hypothesis is 
that there is no change in the coefficient from one year to the next.  The final row for each 
occupation shows the t-statistics. 
As an example consider the private sector in Table 1a.  The figure of 0.074 for 2000 shows 
that the predicted log of earnings of a man assuming that he works in the private sector is 
0.074 log units larger than the predicted log earnings of the same man assuming that he 
works in the non PRB Public sector.  If the estimate is small, this translates approximately 
into the percentage gain in earnings (7.4%) from moving from the non-PRB public sector 
into the private sector.
17  The 3 asterisks indicate the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference in the coefficients for the two sectors is robustly rejected.  The 
sample contains 22,801 private sector male workers.  Table 1b gives an estimate of 0.010 
for the private sector using 1999/2000.  This figure equals the difference in the estimates 
                                                 
14  A longer discussion of these and similar results for 1993-2003 is available in an earlier research report.  
(See OME webpage:  http://www.ome.uk.com/research.cfm. 
15  The hypothesis testing uses robust standard errors. 
16 We also estimated the results of a test of whether the estimates for the PRB occupations are significantly 
different from those in the Private Sector. We do not report those estimates here but changing the reference 
group makes no difference to the results or the inference involved. 
17  The exact change is 100(exp(0.074)-1)%=7.7%   13 
in Table 1a for 2000 (0.074) and 1999 (0.064).  The differential with the non-PRB public 
sector therefore rose by 0.010.  There are no asterisks so this difference is not statistically 
significant which is confirmed by the t-statistic of 0.77. 
The number of observations varies across occupational groups.  The sample size roughly 
doubled in 1997 so that the earlier data is less reliable.  After 1997, there remain less than 
100 observations for male PAMs, male prison officers, female Medical Practitioners and 
female Police Officers.  The small numbers of women working in the Prison Service and 
the Armed Forces mean extreme caution should be exercised in interpreting these cases.  
The Table reports estimates of 9 coefficients for each of 14 years.  Even in an ideal world 
there would be some odd results given the large number of implied tests. 
The one feature of the results is their variability across occupations and gender.  Only two 
generalisations are possible; Doctors and Dentists and Police, whether male or female, are 
consistently paid more than comparable individuals in  the non-PRB public sector.  Men 
working in the Armed Forces are also more highly paid.  Taking into account the small 
number involved, this is almost certainly true for women as well.  Male nurses are 
consistently paid less than  similar workers  the non-PRB public sector in contrast to 
women who have been more since 1998.  This pattern is repeated for PAMs and teachers 
although the exact details vary.  Male PAMs are paid less or about the same as the control 
group; once again in contrast to women who have been more since 1998.  Male teachers 
are paid significantly less than the non-PRB public sector until 2000 (secondary) or 2001 
(primary) and then are about the same for the remainder of the period.  Female secondary 
school teachers have been paid consistently more than the control group and female 
primary school teachers typically more (although 2000-01 and 2005-06 are exceptions). 
Figures 3a and 3b graph these estimates for men and for women respectively.  The vertical 
distance from each line and the horizontal axis measures the occupational pay difference 
for each occupation relative to the Non PRB public sector.  We have also emphasised the 
estimates for the Private sector in bold on each graph.  The vertical distance between each 
point on a PRB line and the private sector line measures the corresponding occupational 
differential relative to the Private Sector.  Since the estimates have been conditioned for all 
the control variables, we can interpret these vertical distances as the measures of the 
compensated wage differences between each occupation and either the Non PRB public 
sector or the private sector.     14 
Figure 3a confirms that male Medical Practitioners, Police and Armed Forces earn more 
that their Private Sector and Non-PRB public sector counterparts over the whole period.  
Although the trends are not pronounced, private sector pay  for men rose  very slowly 
relative to non-PRB pay from 1993 to 2002 as did Medical Practitioner pay.  Police pay 
fell  relatively. Most of the other groups (Teachers etc) have remained roughly stable 
compared with the non-PRB public sector.  Figure 3b shows relative pay for women has 
remained fairly constant in most occupations.  A notable exception is Medical 
Practitioners.  The erratic pattern in the years to 1996 may be due to the small number of 
observations, but even so relative pay appears much higher at the end of the period than 
the beginning. 
Tables 1b and 2b and Figures 4a and 4b display our difference in difference estimates.  
Tables 1b and 2b report the change in the estimated differential in log earnings for each 
PRB.  The first rows suggest that pay in the non-PRB public sector has been tracking that 
of the private sector for both me and for women.  Examination of Table 1b and 2b reveals 
that there are very few years where there was a significant impact of the PRBs.  Looking 
at the 5% level for men the exceptions are 1998/9 for Medical Practitioners, 1993/4 for the 
Armed Forces and 2001/2 for Teachers.
18 For women the exceptions are 2003/4 for the 
Police, 2002/3 and 2004/5 for Prison Officers and 1993/4 and 1998/9 for Medical 
Practitioners.  Even if we disregard the fact that there are few female Prison Officers and 
few Doctors and Dentists in 1993, there are not many significant estimates.  Tables 1b and 
2b suggest strongly that the pay of occupations covered by PRBs are moving in line with 
the pay of occupations in the remainder of the public sector.   
Figures 4a and 4b illustrate what is happening.
19  Most of the changes for men lie in the 
interval [-0.05,0.05] and are insignificant.  The significant changes appear as outliers such 
as Medical Practitioners and Nurses and Midwives in 1999/2000.  The women’s chart 
emphasises the erratic nature of the earnings for Doctors and Dentists but once again most 
changes are bunched in a relatively small interval and are insignificant. 
                                                 
18  Bear in mind that if the null of no effect is correct and each observation is independent, we would expect 
5% of the observations to be significant.  Ignoring the private sector and the Prison Service, we would 
anticipate 4 of the 77 estimates to be significant.  If the significance level were 10%, we would not be 
surprised to see 8 estimates that are significant at the 10% level. 
19  The dates refer to the change from year before to the year indicated e.g. 1994 means the change from 
1993 to 1994.  The discontinuities in the data mean that there are ‘missing’ observations for 1996/97 and 
2000/01.    15 
 
5. Conclusions. 
This paper has examined the determinants of the real weekly earnings of full-time workers 
aged 20-60 over a recent period of 14 years and across different occupational groups 
covered or not by the PRBs.  Composition effects occur when individuals working in 
different occupations are compared.  To avoid these problems, we have employed 
regression analyses to control for the different factors that affect earnings. 
The policy implications of these estimates are not straightforward.  The estimates show the 
difference in real weekly earnings of an individual if that individual were to work in the 
two occupations.  This difference may merely be a compensating differential.  Individuals 
accept lower earnings to work in the public sector because they value other attributes of 
public sector work such as better job security or pensions or even something more 
nebulous such as working for the public good.  The positive differentials observed for 
some groups such as Medical Practitioners and the Police may compensate for greater 
stress and responsibility.  In several of these occupations, either the employers or the 
employees may have significant market power.   
If we assume stability in these factors over the period covered by our data, then we would 
expect the estimated differences to be similar over time.  If the differences consistently fall 
in value, then we would expect there to be pressure on the recruitment and retention of 
good quality staff.  Thus the tendency for the relative pay of non-PRB public sector 
workers to fall over time suggests that ceteris paribus it will be more difficult to maintain 
the labour force without lowering standards.   
We observe considerable stability in the relationship between the earnings of different pay 
groups from one year to the next suggesting that PRBs are not exerting an independent 
influence on pay.  However our results are evidence of correlation rather than causation.  It 
may be that PRB pay is tracking that of the remainder of the public sector, or indeed that 
PRBs are acting as a leader in the setting of pay for the remainder of the public sector.  In 
practice, it is more likely both sets of institutions are governed by a common factor, in this 
case the Treasury and its spending limits.  In which case one policy implication of our 
results is that public sector pay for all occupations could all be set by the government with 
uniform across the board pay rises after due consideration of the trends in inflation. (This 
is de facto what happens in most European countries such as France).  Our results suggest 
that such a policy would not have yielded significantly different pay settlements to those   16 
were observed over the whole 1993-2006 period we have studied.  The natural limitation 
to this conclusion is that it would require that the present pay relativities  between 
occupations are, in some sense, the correct. If this were not the case then some mechanism 
would need to be put in place to rectify anomalies and other relative pay injustices. In 
addition such a conclusion would also ignore the other part of the PRBs remit which is to 
examine conditions of service - we have not considered their role in this regard.  Nor have 
we considered the possibility that PRBs could take a more proactive role in changing the 
pay structure within an occupation by, for example, recommending an across the board flat 
lump sum pay rise (rather than a conventional percentage pay award)
20 – as this would act 
as a redistributional device for the allocation of pay – giving by definition more pay to 
those in junior position.  
The issues raised by this paper are far from resolved.  It is the case that government has 
done special deals with groups of workers outside of the normal pay setting mechanism.  
These may explain some of the results observed here.  Further the paper focuses on pay 
setting from one year to the next rather than trends over a long period of time.  The remit 
of Pay Review Bodies covers pay and conditions as well as other factors while this paper 




                                                 
20 Such a recommendation was indeed made by the DDRB for the first time in 2007.   17 
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Figure 2: Differentials by gender 
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Figure 3b Female % Occupational Wage Differentials PRB Occupations Relative to 
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Figure 4a.  Male Year on Year Diff-in-Diff Impact of PRBs 
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Table 1a: Effects of Working in PRB and Other Occupations (Men)  
(log weekly real earnings, SOC90, control group non-PRB sector)  
   1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Private Sector  0.021  0.003  0.019  0.047  0.054  0.067  0.064  0.074 
Non-PRB public sector  *      ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  13003  12675  13159  13099  25855  25674  24342  22801 
PRB Groups                 
Teachers (primary ed.)  -0.042  -0.079  -0.075  -0.049  -0.067  -0.057  -0.044  -0.083 
Non-PRB public sector    ***  **  *  ***  **  **  *** 
Number  101  92  86  101  165  150  146  143 
Teachers (secondary ed.)  -0.036  -0.074  -0.031  -0.039  -0.027  -0.055  -0.055  -0.036 
Non-PRB public sector  **  ***  *  **  **  ***  ***  ** 
Number  265  268  294  242  488  469  488  450 
Nurses & midwives  -0.131  -0.144  -0.104  -0.078  -0.134  -0.136  -0.058  -0.033 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  **   
Number  64  79  64  73  154  151  130  128 
Practices allied to medicine  -0.132  -0.207  -0.014  -0.052  -0.078  0.039  -0.042  -0.073 
Non-PRB public sector  *  ***      **      * 
Number  23  18  20  30  53  43  45  50 
Medical Practitioners  0.234  0.331  0.292  0.304  0.324  0.290  0.389  0.396 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  42  41  55  45  101  122  107  105 
Prison officers  0.161  0.119  0.156  0.114  0.088  0.064  0.086  0.091 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  **  ***  **  ***  *** 
Number  42  43  36  42  86  101  107  98 
Armed Forces  0.214  0.117  0.150  0.185  0.228  0.209  0.207  0.203 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  151  137  162  142  266  247  249  199 
Police  0.338  0.317  0.316  0.325  0.288  0.271  0.265  0.249 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  243  238  267  220  436  461  405  399   2 
Table 1a: Effects of Working in PRB and Other Occupations (Men)  
(log weekly real earnings, SOC 2000, control group non-PRB sector)  
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Private Sector  0.086  0.113  0.097  0.076  0.081  0.070 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  22572  22013  20649  19304  18525  17711 
PRB Groups             
Teachers (primary ed.)  -0.055  0.032  0.003  -0.015  0.022  0.027 
Non-PRB public sector  **           
Number  135  137  147  141  142  117 
Teachers (secondary ed.)  -0.022  0.009  0.018  0.021  0.023  0.020 
Non-PRB public sector             
Number  388  403  416  408  387  389 
Nurses & midwives  -0.058  -0.071  -0.104  -0.109  -0.087  -0.063 
Non-PRB public sector  **  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  119  115  129  122  127  114 
Practices allied to medicine  -0.075  -0.084  -0.075  -0.041  -0.021  0.013 
Non-PRB public sector  **    **       
Number  82  90  91  98  90  85 
Medical Practitioners  0.408  0.484  0.488  0.486  0.437  0.445 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  110  142  114  114  130  112 
Prison officers  -0.014  0.038  0.046  -0.002  0.029  0.008 
Non-PRB public sector             
Number  83  75  65  74  72  65 
Armed Forces  0.254  0.204  0.225  0.220  0.269  0.273 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  200  171  152  144  145  119 
Police  0.250  0.256  0.242  0.236  0.233  0.219 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  359  350  349  338  304  267 
   3 
Table 1b: Estimates of changes in coefficients for Men 
(log weekly real earnings, control group non-PRB sector)  






















Private Sector  -0.018  0.016  0.028  0.013  -0.003  0.010  0.027  -0.016  -0.021  0.005  -0.011 
Non-PRB public sector              *         
t-statistic  -1.08  0.92  1.61  0.99  -0.23  0.77  1.93  -1.14  -1.48  0.34  -0.76 
PRB Groups                       
Teachers (primary ed.)  -0.037  0.004  0.026  0.010  0.013  -0.039  0.086  -0.029  -0.018  0.036  0.006 
Non-PRB public sector              **         
T-statistic  -0.93  0.09  0.64  0.33  0.43  -1.18  2.36  -0.81  -0.52  1.07  0.15 
Teachers (secondary ed.)  -0.038  0.043  -0.008  -0.028  -0.000  0.019  0.031  0.009  0.003  0.002  -0.003 
Non-PRB public sector    *                   
T-statistic  -1.59  1.78  -0.30  -1.39  -0.02  0.90  1.33  0.41  0.13  0.08  -0.13 
Nurses & midwives  -0.014  0.040  0.026  -0.001  0.078  0.024  -0.013  -0.033  -0.005  0.021  0.024 
Non-PRB public sector          **             
T-statistic  -0.26  0.78  0.54  -0.04  2.36  0.73  -0.037  -0.99  -0.14  0.53  0.70 
Practices allied to medicine  -0.075  0.193  -0.037  0.039  -0.003  -0.031  0.071  -0.072  0.034  0.020  0.034 
Non-PRB public sector    *                   
T-statistic  -0.72  1.84  -0.39  0.69  -0.04  -0.49  1.50  -1.55  0.73  0.43  0.74 
Medical Practitioners  0.097  -0.040  0.012  -0.034  0.099  0.006  0.076  0.004  -0.003  -0.048  0.008 
Non-PRB public sector          **    *         
T-statistic  1.44  -0.58  0.17  -0.64  2.01  0.14  1.69  0.11  -0.06  -1.14  0.16 
Prison officers  -0.042  0.037  -0.041  -0.025  0.023  0.005  0.052  0.008  -0.048  0.031  -0.021 
Non-PRB public sector                       
T-statistic  -0.82  0.78  -0.66  -0.61  0.57  0.12  1.27  0.20  -1.08  0.76  -0.51 
Armed Forces  -0.096  0.033  0.035  -0.020  -0.001  -0.004  -0.050  0.021  -0.005  0.049  0.003 
Non-PRB public sector  **                     
T-statistic  -2.46  0.89  0.94  -0.69  -0.05  -0.14  -1.42  0.60  -0.14  1.30  0.07 
Police  -0.022  -0.001  0.009  -0.017  -0.007  -0.016  0.006  -0.014  -0.006  -0.004  -0.014 
Non-PRB public sector                       
T-statistic  -0.78  -0.03  0.34  -0.86  -0.32  -0.75  0.28  -0.65  -0.25  -0.15  -0.55 
The figures show the coefficient for year t+1 minus that for year t.  (b* and do*) 
The row labelled ‘non-PRB public sector’ shows significance of estimate.   4 
Table 2a: Effects of Working in PRB and Other Occupations (Women)  
(log weekly real earnings, SOC90, control group non-PRB sector) 
   1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Private Sector  -0.057  -0.044  -0.042  -0.049  -0.029  -0.026  -0.017  -0.017 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  **  * 
Number  6693  6674  6955  6841  13883  13947  13285  12448 
PRB Groups                 
Teachers (primary ed.)  0.058  0.061  0.079  0.037  0.047  0.027  0.027  0.021 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  **  ***  **  **   
Number  423  410  406  431  827  841  817  783 
Teachers (secondary ed.)  0.086  0.092  0.113  0.088  0.075  0.048  0.042  0.072 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  262  268  255  240  518  506  523  479 
Nurses & midwives  0.004  0.022  -0.005  0.008  -0.004  -0.008  0.033  0.064 
Non-PRB public sector              **  *** 
Number  509  474  464  495  884  888  869  806 
Practices allied to medicine  0.019  0.075  -0.001  -0.035  0.022  0.028  0.087  0.062 
Non-PRB public sector    **          ***  ** 
Number  100  84  100  93  182  202  188  183 
Medical Practitioners  0.051  0.342  0.238  0.191  0.311  0.343  0.500  0.363 
Non-PRB public sector    ***  ***  **  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  22  19  33  24  57  68  70  53 
Prison officers  0.298  0.459  0.264  0.329  0.238  0.187  0.045  0.071 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***     
Number  6  4  7  4  17  18  20  18 
Armed Forces  0.257  0.010  0.241  0.115  0.161  0.425  0.299  0.368 
Non-PRB public sector  ***    *    *  ***  ***  *** 
Number  4  8  3  8  13  9  18  11 
Police  0.374  0.422  0.358  0.424  0.359  0.310  0.333  0.365 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  28  33  34  31  73  66  79  85   5 
Table 2a: Effects of Working in PRB and Other Occupations (Women) 
(log weekly real earnings, , SOC 2000, control group non-PRB public sector)  
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Private sector  -0.006  0.012  0.004  -0.021  -0.024  -0.027 
        **  ***  *** 
Number  1795  1766  1713  1753  1873  1662 
PRB Groups             
Teachers (primary ed.)  0.015  0.034  0.059  0.052  0.018  -0.008 
Non-PRB public sector    **  ***  ***     
Number  707  682  706  678  625  630 
Teachers (secondary ed.)  0.054  0.036  0.070  0.063  0.051  0.042 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  **  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  476  494  477  489  466  487 
Nurses & midwives  0.053  0.063  0.091  0.067  0.033  0.044 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  721  724  730  670  668  660 
Practices allied to medicine  0.120  0.152  0.132  0.121  0.115  0.108 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  186  169  146  167  165  166 
Medical Practitioners  0.443  0.498  0.513  0.497  0.457  0.446 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  77  84  73  83  83  98 
Prison officers  0.080  0.112  -0.035  -0.090  0.105  0.005 
Non-PRB public sector    **    *  **   
Number  12  15  18  21  25  27 
Armed Forces  0.177  0.192  0.340  0.270  0.269  0.289 
Non-PRB public sector  *  **  ***  **  **  *** 
Number  13  5  7  8  10  9 
Police  0.245  0.301  0.326  0.231  0.222  0.159 
Non-PRB public sector  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Number  70  73  88  75  76  89 
   6 
Table 2b: Estimates of changes in coefficients for women 
(log weekly real earnings, control group non-PRB sector) 






















Private Sector  0.013  0.002  -0.006  0.004  0.009  0.000  0.018  -0.008  -0.025  -0.003  -0.003 
Non-PRB public sector                  **     
t-statistic  0.81  0.11  -0.40  0.34  0.71  -0.01  1.60  -0.69  -2.14  -0.22  -0.28 
PRB Groups                       
Teachers (primary ed.)  0.003  0.018  -0.041  -0.020  0.000  -0.006  0.020  0.024  -0.007  -0.034  -0.026 
Non-PRB public sector                       
T-statistic  0.13  0.66  -1.55  -1.08  0.02  -0.33  0.99  1.25  -0.34  -1.60  1.21 
Teachers (secondary ed.)  0.006  0.021  -0.025  -0.027  -0.006  0.03  -0.018  0.034  -0.007  -0.012  -0.009 
Non-PRB public sector                       
T-statistic  0.21  0.72  -0.83  -1.34  -0.29  1.40  -0.82  1.51  0.31  -0.53  -0.37 
Nurses & midwives  0.018  -0.027  0.013  -0.004  0.041  0.031  0.010  0.028  -0.024  -0.033  0.010 
Non-PRB public sector          **          *   
T-statistic  0.67  -0.97  0.49  -0.19  2.23  1.61  0.56  1.56  -1.31  -1.82  0.57 
Practices allied to medicine  0.056  -0.076  -0.034  0.006  0.06  -0.026  0.032  -0.020  -0.011  -0.006  -0.007 
Non-PRB public sector    *      *             
T-statistic  1.33  -1.71  -0.77  0.20  1.92  -0.78  1.04  -0.61  -0.32  -0.17  0.20 
Medical Practitioners  0.292  -0.103  -0.047  0.032  0.158  -0.138  0.055  0.015  -0.017  -0.040  -0.011 
Non-PRB public sector  ***        **  *           
T-statistic  2.08  -0.91  -0.44  0.46  2.20  -1.91  1.03  0.28  -0.30  -0.71  -0.19 
Prison officers  0.161  -0.195  0.066  -0.052  -0.141  0.026  0.032  -0.147  -0.055  0.196  -0.100 
Non-PRB public sector    *      *      **    ***   
T-statistic  1.27  -1.67  0.56  -0.56  -1.76  0.32  0.32  -2.05  -0.78  2.72  -1.33 
Armed Forces  -0.247  0.231  -0.126  0.265  -0.126  0.069  0.015  0.148  -0.070  -0.001  0.016 
Non-PRB public sector        **               
T-statistic  -1.29  1.08  -0.81  2.13  -1.12  0.79  0.12  1.30  -0.51  -0.01  0.11 
Police  0.048  -0.064  0.066  -0.050  0.023  0.032  0.055  0.026  -0.095  -0.009  -0.063 
Non-PRB public sector                  **     
T-statistic  0.61  -0.88  1.08  -1.27  0.54  0.78  1.28  0.68  -2.42  -0.20  -1.33 
The figures show the coefficient for year t+1 minus that for year t.  (b* and do*) 
The row labelled ‘non-PRB public sector’ shows significance of estimate.   7 
Appendix A:  Definition of Occupational Groups 
Definition of occupations using SOC 2000 (2001-2006) 
Non-PRB Public Sector 
1111  Senior officials in national government  1113  Senior officials in local government 
1173  Senior officers in fire, ambulance, prison and related services 
1181  Hospital and health service managers 
1184  Social services managers  2212  Psychologists  
2311  Higher education teaching professionals 
2312  Further education teaching professionals 
2313  Education officers, school inspectors 
2317  Registrars and senior administrators of educational establishments 
2419  Legal professionals n.e.c. 
2441  Public service administrative professionals 
2442  Social workers 
2443  Probation officers 
3232  Housing and welfare officers 
3313  Fire service officers (leading fire officer and below) 
3319  Protective service associate professionals n.e.c. (e.g. customs officers, scenes of crime 
officers) 
3511  Air traffic controllers 
3551  Conservation and environmental protection officers  
3561  Public service associate professionals 
3565  Inspectors of factories, utilities and trading standards 
3566  Statutory examiners 
3568  Environmental health officers      4111  Civil Service executive officers 
4112  Civil Service administrative officers and assistants 
4113  Local government clerical officers and assistants 
6111  Nursing auxiliaries and assistants 
6112  Ambulance staff (excluding paramedics)    9221  Hospital porters  
9243  School crossing patrol attendants     9244  School mid-day assistants  
PRB Groups and Police 
Medical Practitioners 
2211  Medical practitioners    2215  Dental practitioners 
Armed Forces 
1171  Officers in armed forces    3311  NCOs and other ranks 
Prison Officers 
3314  Prison service officers (below principal officer) 
Nurses and Midwives 
3211  Nurses        3212  Midwives 
Practices Allied to Medicine (PAM) 
3213  Paramedics      3214  Medical radiographers 
3215  Chiropodists      3218  Medical and dental technicians 
3221  Physiotherapists    3222  Occupational therapists 
3223  Speech and language therapists  3229  Therapists not elsewhere coded 
Teachers Secondary 
2314  Secondary education teaching professionals  2319  Teaching professionals n.e.c. 
Teachers Primary 
2315  Primary and nursery education teaching professionals  2316  Special needs education 
teaching professionals 
Police 
1172  Police officers (inspectors and above)    3312  Police officers (sergeant and 
below)   8 
Definition of occupations using SOC90 
Non-PRB Public Sector 
100  General Administrators 
102  Local Government Officers 
103  General Administrators 
132  Civil Service Executive Officers 
153  Fire service officers 
155  Customs & excise, immigration service officers (customs: chief preventive officer & 
above; excise: surveyor & above) 
191  Registrars & administrators of educational establishments 
230  University & polytechnic teaching professionals 
231  Higher & further education teaching professionals 
232  Education officers, school inspectors  240  Judges & officers of the court 
290  Psychologists        293  Social workers, probation officers 
330  Air traffic planners & controllers  348  Environmental health officers 
394  Inspectors of factories, utilities & trading standards 
395  Other statutory & similar inspectors 
400  Civil Service administrative officers & assistants 
401  Local government clerical officers & assistants 
611  Fire service officers (leading fire officer & below) 
613  Customs & excise officers, immigration officers (customs: below chief preventive officer; 
excise: below surveyor) 
619  Other security and protective service occupations n.e.c.  
640  Assistant nurses, nursing auxiliaries  641  Hospital ward assistants 
642  Ambulance staff      950  Hospital porters 
Pay Review Body (PRB) Groups and Police  
Medical Practitioners 
220  Medical practitioners      223  Dental practitioners 
Armed Forces 
150  Armed Forces (Officers)     600  Armed Forces (NCOs and other ranks) 
Prison Officers 
154  Prison Officers (princ. officers & above)  612  Prison Officers (below princ. officer) 
Nurses and Midwives 
340  Nurses          341  Midwives 
Practices Allied to Medicine (PAM) 
342  Medical radiographers 
343  Physiotherapists      344  Chiropodists 
346  Medical Technicians      347  Occupational & Other Therapists 
Teachers Secondary 
233  Secondary (& middle school deemed secondary) education teaching professionals 
239  Other teaching professionals not elsewhere coded 
Teachers Primary   
234  Primary (& middle school deemed primary) & nursery education teaching professionals 
235  Special education teaching professionals 
Police  
152  Police officers (inspector & above)  610  Police officers (sergeant & below)   9 
Appendix B:  Definition of other variables 
Qualifications 
The qualifications variables are a set of 6 dummies for the highest qualification obtained using the 
LFS derived variable Quald.  Broad details of this variable are given in the Labour Force Survey 
User Guide Volume 3 (Details of LFS variables) and specific details in Volume 4 (LFS Standard 
derived variables).  Quald has the advantage that it provides a simple, comprehensible and relevant 
classification that it is readily available for our data period.  Quald includes vocational 
qualifications and reflects NVQ level.  The main difference lies in that quald distinguishes 
between degree level qualifications and other NVQ level 4 qualifications such as non-degree level 
teaching and nursing qualifications.  Quald does not make some of the distinctions used by NVQs.  
For instance, the number of A-levels does not matter for quald.  The similarly defined variable, 
Qualdp, is used for 1993-95.  Our qualification dummies identify the groups: "Degree or 
equivalent", "Higher Education", "GCE A Level or equivalent", "GCSE A*-C or equiv", "Other 
quals" with the control group "No quals". 
Manual Occupations 
Manual occupations are defined for 2001-2006 using the LFS derived variable nsecm which 
reports the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) in the main job.  The 
manual dummy is derived from the table below.  Manual occupations are defined for 1993-2000 
using the LFS derived variable socmanm which reports whether the individual’s main job was 
manual or non-manual or armed forces.  Armed forces were defined as manual. 
Table B.1. Link between Social Class and SEC 
Manual vs Non-
manual  Social Class  NS-SEC Operational Categories 
Non-manual  I  Professional, etc. occupations  3.1, 3.3 
Non-manual  II 
Managerial and Technical 
occupations 
1, 2, 3.2, 3.4, 4.1, 4.3, 5, 7.3, 8.1, 8.2, 
9.2 
Non-manual  III N  Skilled occupations – non-manual  4.2, 4.4, 6, 7.1, 7.2, 12.1, 12.6 
Manual 
III 
M  Skilled occupations - manual  7.4, 9.1, 10, 11.1, 12.3, 13.3 
Manual  IV  Partly skilled occupations 
11.2, 12.2, 12.4, 12.5, 12.7, 13.1, 13.2, 
13.5 
Manual  V  Unskilled occupations  13.4 
 
 
 